The Tortoise and the Hare: The Race Between Vaccine
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The Tortoise and the Hare: The Race Between Vaccine Rollout and New COVID Variants by David Turner, Balázs Égert, Yvan Guillemette and Jarmila Botev, OECD Economics Department Variants of the virus causing COVID-19, notably the so-called ‘UK variant’, account for a large part of the resurgence of infections in many OECD countries since the latter part of 2020. Seasonal effects also drive fluctuations in virus incidence. More recently, vaccination has been very effective at curbing COVID-19 infections, substituting for lockdown policies at much lower costs to the economy. Those are among the main findings of a recent Economics Department Working Paper – The Tortoise and the Hare: The Race Between Vaccine Rollout and New COVID Variants – an update to a previous version of the study published last year. The study relates country-level daily reproduction numbers for OECD countries to several potential explanatory factors, including containment policies, public-health policies, seasonal conditions, the prevalence of variants, vaccination rates as well as proxies for spontaneous behavioural changes and natural immunity, all at once within the same framework. It also relates containment policies to the OECD weekly GDP tracker to study their effects on economic activity. Some new variants of the virus are estimated to be able to boost the effective reproduction number by up to 50%. Seasonal effects are also found to increase the effective reproduction number in fall/winter, in some countries by up to 25% relative to summer. The rapidity of these adverse shocks represent a
major challenge to policy-makers because they can coincide and
take full effect over a matter of a few months. The two
effects together can potentially boost reproduction numbers by
up to 90%.
Thankfully, vaccination is found to powerfully reduce the
spread of the virus. The estimated effects can be stated in
intervention-equivalent terms (see figure). Fully vaccinating…
7% of the population is equivalent to either complete
school closure, requiring people not to leave the house
with minimal exceptions, or banning all public
gatherings;
15% of the population is equivalent to closing down all-
but-essential workplaces;
20% of the population is equivalent to closing down all-
but-essential workplaces as well as public transport;
50% of the population is equivalent to simultaneously
applying all of the above restrictions as well as
closing all international borders.
And, of course, vaccination does not have the damaging effects
on economic activity that lockdown policies have, rather it
boosts activity by enabling lockdown policies to be eased. The
study’s results are used to examine a few scenarios that
differ in the presence of COVID variants and the speed of
vaccination.
In a baseline scenario without variants nor vaccines, stringent containment policies are needed to keep the reproduction number below 1, and the situation is nevertheless precarious in that many factors, including seasonal influences, have the potential to push the reproduction number above 1 and so lead to a surge in infections. Another scenario assumes that the UK variant becomes predominant, leading to an increase in transmissibility of the virus by 35%. It shows that with only 13% of the population fully vaccinated (which corresponds to the OECD median in mid- May), the reproduction number remains above 1. Policy-makers then face difficult choices about which containment policies to tighten further. For instance, schools might need to remain closed full time, which would be just sufficient to keep the reproduction number below 1. A more optimistic scenario illustrates how quick vaccine rollout not only avoids the need to tighten containment polices despite the presence of the UK variant, but enables those in place to be progressively relaxed. For example, with 40% of the population fully vaccinated (which is close to the shares in the United States and United Kingdom at end-May), there is no need for any stay-at-home requirements or workplace closure and restrictions on gatherings can start to be relaxed, which has the added benefit of raising GDP by 4% relative to the baseline scenario. Together, the scenarios suggest that a rapid rollout of vaccinations is needed to compensate for the pressure from more infectious variants and avoid a cycle of stop-and-go mitigation policies. For those countries now going into summer, it is also important that policy-makers are not lulled into a false sense of security by the temporary decline in reproduction numbers due to seasonal factors, as in the summer of 2020. Failure to vaccinate a sufficient share of the population could then lead to a resurgence of the virus in the winter as seasonal factors reverse.
Further reading Turner, D., B. Égert, Y. Guillemette and J. Botev (2021), “The Tortoise and the Hare: The Race Between Vaccine Rollout and New COVID Variants”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1672, Paris, OECD Publishing. América Latina tras el COVID-19: cómo impulsar una recuperación tan deseada Jens Arnold, Aida Caldera-Sánchez, Paula Garda, Alberto González Pandiella, Alvaro S. Pereira. Departamento de Economía, OCDE América Latina es una de las regiones más golpeadas por el COVID-19 y tendrá una recuperación más lenta. La región ha concentrado cerca de 1 millón de muertes, o un tercio del total de muertes por COVID-19 en el mundo. En términos económicos también es la región que más se ha visto afectada en mundo con una caída del PIB de alrededor de 7% en 2020, comparado con 5% de media en la OCDE. Esto es debido a las características estructurales de la región: sistemas sanitarios y redes de seguridad social débiles, grandes sectores informales, fuerte dependencia del turismo, gran proporción del empleo en ocupaciones no compatibles con el trabajo a distancia, y un margen limitado para el apoyo fiscal. Hacia adelante la OCDE prevé que el crecimiento de seis grandes economías de la región, que abarcan alrededor del 85% del PIB de América Latina, sea del 4.9% en 2021, y un 2.8% en 2022 (Tabla). La recuperación de la actividad económica se ha frenado a inicios del 2021, frente a las nuevas medidas de
contención en la mayoría de los países de la región, y se retomará a medida que avanzan los procesos de vacunación y mejora la situación sanitaria. Pero la recuperación será gradual, sin recuperar el terreno perdido en el PIB per-cápita ni siquiera en 2022 (Gráfico 1). Existe una alta incertidumbre en torno a la evolución de la pandemia y los procesos de vacunación, así como importantes vulnerabilidades. La prioridad inmediata en la región debe ser evitar más brotes del COVID-19, fortaleciendo los sistemas de salud y acelerando la vacunación, siguiendo el ejemplo de Chile que ha visto uno de los procesos de vacunación más rápidos del mundo. En este sentido, la cooperación internacional y la efectiva distribución de vacunas a través de COVAX será crucial. En algunas economías de la región el incremento de los precios de las materias primas está dando un respiro a las apretadas arcas fiscales y un viento de cola a la inversión y al crecimiento económico. El aumento de las remesas y el crecimiento de la economía global también apoyan positivamente, particularmente a las economías más abiertas. Sin embargo, la región tiene cuentas fiscales frágiles y es muy sensible a cambios en las condiciones financieras globales, como se vio a inicios del 2021. Episodios de violencia y malestar social, presentes desde antes de la pandemia, siguen siendo un riesgo más que vigente, que podrían retrasar la recuperación. El incremento de la deuda pública, debido a los esfuerzos que han hecho muchos países para paliar los efectos negativos del COVID-19, dejan sólo un estrecho margen para la política fiscal, si no se hacen reformas (como ya lo discutimos aquí), y es una de las principales vulnerabilidades en la región. Asimismo, se aproximan años de elecciones en varios de los países de la región. Todos esos factores crean un ambiente de incertidumbre y volatilidad. Para lograr la tan deseada recuperación, América Latina tiene que revertir el impacto negativo de la pandemia y continuar reduciendo la pobreza y las desigualdades, que ya eran altas
antes de la pandemia. Las cifras en algunos países de la región ya comienzan a mostrar que la pobreza y la desigualdad de ingresos se han incrementado, con pérdidas de empleo que alcanzan a más de 14 millones de personas desde que empezó la pandemia. Los más vulnerables fueran los más afectados: las mujeres, los más jóvenes, y los trabajadores informales (Gráfica 2, panel A). La recuperación del empleo es incipiente, pero está liderada por los informales, amenazando con un aumento persistente de la informalidad. Y esto es aún más grave para los jóvenes, ya que los primeros trabajos tienden a tener impactos duraderos en sus carreras y salarios. El cierre de las escuelas puede tener graves consecuencias a largo plazo. Con 300 días de escuela perdidos, el doble de la media de países OCDE (panel B), América Latina ha sido la región del mundo donde las escuelas han estado más tiempo cerradas. A día de hoy, unos 114 millones de estudiantes siguen sin poder asistir en persona. El efecto es aún más negativo para los más vulnerables, aquellos que no tienen acceso a educación digital y conectividad, y a tantos niños de hogares más desfavorecidos que han abandonado la educación escolar por completo. Es probable que la pandemia amplíe las ya elevadas brechas de resultados educativos por nivel socioeconómico, impactando negativamente los salarios futuros y la productividad e incrementando fuertemente la desigualdad de oportunidades (como lo demuestran Lustig y coautores aquí). El cierre de escuelas limita además el crecimiento del empleo femenino, que ha sido uno de los más impactados por la pandemia. Es más urgente que nunca emprender reformas que permitan una rápida recuperación asegurando al mismo tiempo que nadie se quede atrás. Las trasferencias monetarias, el mayor acceso a los beneficios de desempleo y/o subsidios al empleo y a la contratación son fundamentales para mitigar los impactos negativos de la crisis y acelerar la recuperación. Y más allá de la necesidad de mantenerlos hasta que la recuperación esté
afianzada, este es el momento oportuno para repensar y fortalecer los mecanismos de protección social de forma permanente (como lo hemos hablado aquí). Esfuerzos para reducir la carga regulatoria son particularmente pertinentes en este momento ya que facilitarían la creación de empresas y empleos formales sin impactos significativos en los presupuestos. Como por ejemplo reduciendo los elevados costes de registro para las empresas (especialmente las PYMEs y las empresas nuevas), o costes laborales no salariales elevados (e.g. Colombia) o las contribuciones a la seguridad social para los trabajadores de bajos ingresos (Argentina). No menos importantes son mejorar la educación y los sistemas de capacitación. Programas de recuperación y para reintegrar en el sistema educativo a aquellos que lo abandonaron durante la pandemia son fundamentales para revertir los impactos negativos de los cierres de escuelas. Reasignar más recursos hacia las etapas más tempranas de la educación (preescolar y primaria) y la escolarización a jornada completa (e.g. Colombia) ayudaría a hacer los sistemas educativos de la región más equitativos y paliar los efectos de la pandemia. Reforzar los sistemas de capacitación ayudaría a los trabajadores, en especial a los más vulnerables, a encontrar trabajos de calidad en el mundo post-Covid. Lo que la región haga ahora determinará la rapidez con la que se recupere y el tipo de recuperación. No es momento de retirar el apoyo fiscal a las economías y debilitar la incipiente recuperación, pero los países deben comenzar el proceso de discusión e identificación de las reformas para recomponer la situación fiscal. Una implementación creíble, que puede ser gradual, es clave para asegurar la sostenibilidad de las finanzas públicas y revertir los aumentos de pobreza y desigualdades. En muchos países de la región, la fuerte y necesaria acción de las políticas fiscales en apoyo de los más afectados dejará cuentas a pagar en el futuro. Los países tendrán que aumentar los ingresos fiscales
y repensar algunos gastos existentes. En el actual contexto de incertidumbre en los mercados financieros, será importante reforzar la voluntad de pagar esa cuenta en el futuro para no afectar el acceso a financiamiento y aumentar los gastos con intereses, porque eso dejaría aún menos recursos para áreas prioritarias como salud, educación o protección social. Con la recuperación afianzada se puede crear el consenso social para lograr una mayor progresividad tanto en los impuestos como en los beneficios sociales. Todos los países de la región tienen margen para incrementar la eficiencia del gasto, focalizar el gasto social en los más vulnerables, incrementar la progresividad de los impuestos sobre la renta y reforzar la lucha contra la evasión fiscal. Incrementar el uso de impuestos verdes, siempre que se compense a los más vulnerables, tiene el doble beneficio de acelerar la transición hacia una economía baja en carbono e incrementar recursos fiscales. Fortalecer los marcos fiscales, incluyendo las reglas fiscales y los consejos fiscales independientes ayudaría a incrementar la credibilidad en la sustentabilidad de las finanzas públicas. Tabla. Perspectivas Económicas para América Latina
Nota: AL es la media ponderada por PIB a paridad de poderes de compra de los 6 países en la tabla. Fuente: Perspectivas Económicas de la OCDE n. 109, mayo 2021. Gráfico 1. La pandemia está dejando un daño duradero en América Latina Nota: AL se refiere a la media ponderada por PIB a paridad de poderes de compra de Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica y México. Fuente: Perspectivas Económicas de la OCDE N. 109, mayo 2021 y N. 106, noviembre de 2019. Gráfico 2. El impacto desigual del COVID-19 Nota: En el Panel A, AL es el promedio simple de Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia y México. En el Panel B, AL es el promedio simple de Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica y México. Informales medidos como trabajadores sin
seguridad social, salvo en Colombia que son trabajadores en empresas de menos de 5 empleados. El cierre de escuelas se mide en días desde marzo 2020 hasta abril 2021. La definición de cierre parcial se refiere a sólo algunos niveles o categorías, por ejemplo, sólo la escuela secundaria, o sólo las escuelas públicas. Cierres regionales cuentan como ½. Fuente: Cálculos de la OCDE en base a Encuestas del Mercado laboral: INE- ENE para Chile, INEGI-ENEO nuevo y ENEO para México, DANE-GHEI-Mensual, IGEB-PNAD para Brasil, INDEC- EPH para Argentina y Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker. Para leer en más detalle sobre las proyecciones macroeconómicas, así como los principales desafíos estructurales ir al reporte en la o la versión español y portugués o versión inglés (que incluye proyecciones para todos los países de la OECD y principales desafíos). Información detallada para estos 6 países con sus notas país correspondientes: Argentina | Brasil | Chile | Colombia | Costa Rica | México Une reprise hors du commun: Piloter la transition Aussi disponible en English | Deutsche | Español | Portugués Laurence Boone, Cheffe économiste de l’OCDE
Les perspectives économiques s’éclaircissent, mais notre soulagement se teinte d’inquiétude, car l’embellie est loin d’être la même partout. Malgré l’émergence de nouveaux foyers épidémiques, moins nombreux mais plus dispersés dans le monde, la croissance mondiale continue de se redresser. Nous projetons une hausse de la production mondiale de près de 6 % cette année, une hausse spectaculaire après la contraction de 3 ½ pour cent enregistrée en 2020. Dans la plupart des pays, le PIB pourra ainsi retrouver ses niveaux d’avant la pandémie d’ici la fin de 2022, mais cela est loin d’être suffisant. La trajectoire de croissance de l’économie mondiale reste en effet inférieure à ce qu’elle était avant l’arrivée du COVID-19 et dans bien trop de pays de l’OCDE, les niveaux de vie seront inférieurs à ce que nous projetions avant la pandémie. La réactivité impressionnante des pouvoirs publics a permis une amélioration significative de la situation sanitaire et économique. Seize mois après le début de la pandémie, les pays sont nombreux à mieux gérer les nouvelles vagues de contaminations. Les autorités ont distribué près de 2 milliards de doses de vaccin et les capacités mondiales de dépistage ainsi que de production et d’administration de vaccins ont rapidement augmenté. Les mesures sans précédent
adoptées par les pouvoirs publics ont permis de préserver le tissu économique, les entreprises et l’emploi dans la plupart des économies avancées et dans certaines économies émergentes. Jamais dans l’histoire d’une crise l’intervention des autorités n’avait été aussi rapide et efficace, que cela concerne la santé, la mise au point d’un vaccin en un temps record ou encore la sphère monétaire, budgétaire et financière. Grâce aux mesures prises, le secteur manufacturier connaît une expansion rapide, les échanges de marchandises redémarrent vigoureusement avec la réouverture progressive des frontières, et les voyages reprennent lentement. De plus, la réouverture des activités économiques s’accompagne d’une forte hausse de la consommation et des heures travaillées. Ces signaux sont très encourageants, et suggèrent que les séquelles de la crise pourraient être limitées. Pourtant, les risques sont encore trop nombreux. Les vaccins n’arrivent pas en nombre suffisant dans les économies émergentes et les pays à faible revenu. L’insuffisance de vaccins est une menace inquiétante en soi et pour l’économie de ces pays dont la capacité à soutenir l’activité n’est pas la même que celle des économies avancées. Ils auraient plus de mal à supporter un nouveau fléchissement de la croissance provoqué par le virus, qui entrainerait une aggravation de l’extrême pauvreté et d’éventuelles difficultés à se financer en cas d’inquiétudes sur les marchés financiers. Ce tableau est d’autant plus troublant qu’indépendamment de ses conséquences sur les vies humaines et les conditions d’existence, le maintien de la fermeture des frontières représente, à l’échelle mondiale, un coût social et économique bien supérieur à celui d’une diffusion plus large des vaccins, des outils de dépistage et des équipements médicaux dans les économies émergentes et les pays à faible revenu. De façon plus générale, tant que la grande majorité de la population mondiale ne sera pas vaccinée, nous sommes tous à la merci de l’apparition de nouveaux variants. De nouveaux
confinements et une alternance d’arrêt et de reprise des activités économiques porterait un coup à la confiance. Des entreprises, bien protégées jusqu’à maintenant mais plus endettées qu’avant la pandémie, pourraient faire faillite. Les catégories les plus vulnérables de la population risqueraient de pâtir encore davantage de longues périodes d’inactivité ou d’une baisse de revenus, ce qui aurait pour effet d’exacerber les inégalités, dans les pays et entre pays, et pourrait déstabiliser les économies. Un nouveau risque, qui fait l’objet de nombreux débats, est apparu : celui d’une hausse de l’inflation. Les prix des matières premières augmentent rapidement. La présence de goulets d’étranglement dans certains secteurs et les perturbations des échanges commerciaux entrainent des tensions sur les prix. Ces perturbations devraient commencer à s’estomper vers la fin de l’année avec la normalisation des capacités de production et le rééquilibrage de la consommation vers les services. Les excédents de capacités sur le marché du travail restent considérables, ce qui freine la croissance des salaires. Dans un tel contexte, tant que les anticipations d’inflation resteront bien ancrées et la croissance des salaires modérée, il y a tout lieu de croire que les banques centrales, tout en restant vigilantes, feront abstraction de ces hausses des prix temporaires. Ce qui est plus préoccupant, à notre avis, est le risque que les marchés financiers, eux, ne soient pas indifférents à ces hausses de prix temporaires et aux ajustements de prix relatifs, ce qui pousserait à la hausse les taux d’intérêt et la volatilité. La vigilance est donc de mise. Lorsque des goulets d’étranglement apparaissent dans des secteurs où la production est fortement concentrée, comme celui des puces électroniques, menaçant des pans entiers de la chaîne de production, les pouvoirs publics devraient tout mettre en oeuvre pour alléger ces tensions en intensifiant leur coopération en matière commerciale et en diversifiant les
sources d’approvisionnement. L’une des grandes leçons de cette crise est qu’il faut accorder une plus grande attention à la résilience des chaînes d’approvisionnement, comme en témoigne la hausse parfois brutale des prix dans les secteurs où la concentration de la production est excessive. Plus généralement, les pouvoirs publics ont aussi un rôle à jouer dans la lutte contre les tensions inflationnistes en prenant des mesures à même de stimuler la croissance potentielle et de renforcer la concurrence et les échanges. À l’heure où les perspectives s’éclaircissent, il serait dangereux que croire que les efforts actuellement déployés par les pouvoirs publics sont suffisants pour placer la croissance sur une trajectoire plus vigoureuse et de meilleure qualité, notamment au vu de l’objectif de décarbonation. Des mesures flexibles, évolutives en fonction des circonstances sanitaires et économiques, pour les individus et les entreprises sont indispensables pour ancrer les anticipations de maintien d’un soutien budgétaire ciblé tant que les économies n’auront pas retrouvé le plein-emploi, ou ne s’en approcheront pas. En particulier, il est fondamental de consolider les bilans des petites entreprises viables par des mesures d’aide ou des reports d’imposition. En outre, il est indispensable que l’investissement public accorde à la double transition, verte et numérique, la place qu’elle mérite, et que l’utilisation des fonds rime avec rapidité, efficacité et qualité, ce qui contribuerait aussi à encourager l’investissement privé dans ces domaines. Enfin, la confiance serait renforcée par l’annonce de préparatifs pour mettre en place un cadre budgétaire clair, efficace et viable à moyen terme, fondé sur une revue des dépenses publiques destinée à vérifier l’adéquation entre les priorités retenues, d’une part, et les ambitions poursuivies et les besoins des citoyens d’autre part, et d’une refonte de la fiscalité visant à garantir l’équité, l’efficacité et la progressivité de l’impôt. L’économie mondiale s’achemine vers la reprise, non sans
heurts. Le risque que la croissance post-pandémie soit insuffisante ou ne profite pas au plus grand nombre est élevé. L’avenir dépendra, dans une très large mesure, de l’adoption de cadres de politiques économiques souples, stratégiques et durables, et de la qualité de la coopération internationale. Editorial des Perspectives Économiques Going for Growth: Shaping a vibrant recovery by Laurence Boone, OECD Chief Economist and G20 Finance Deputy A unique opportunity to shape a vibrant recovery After a devastating 2020, prospects are improving. The rollout of vaccines is giving us hope while extraordinary monetary and fiscal buffers continue to support firms, jobs and incomes, limiting the social and economic fallout of the pandemic. Importantly, COVID-19 has exposed how structural weaknesses can weigh on economic resilience. How we respond will shape the recovery and the future of our economies. Governments need to act now to address the structural obstacles to growth,
build resilience and sustainability; boost productivity and facilitate reallocation; and help people adapt to change. The cost of unpreparedness to COVID-19 is counted in lives lost, livelihoods damaged and in long-lasting social and economic scars. Most healthcare systems struggled with a global outbreak on such an unprecedented scale. Social safety nets were unevenly prepared for dealing with the consequences of lockdowns. Jobs and incomes were lost with the most vulnerable people often the hardest hit. As large parts of economic, social and educational activity moved on-line, the opportunity costs of limited digital skills and insufficient infrastructure became real. Governments reacted with emergency measures, unprecedented in size and scope, to cushion the shock. Yet the measures will not fix the underlying structural problems, which left us vulnerable in the first place. The crisis has only added to pre-existing challenges. Before the pandemic, many economies were struggling with sluggish productivity growth amid declining business dynamics. Structural problems in many labour markets included stubbornly high long-term unemployment, informality and poor job quality and security. Moreover, environmental sustainability alongside more general resilience concerns were often absent from growth strategies. As economies reopen in a world of rising digitalisation, changes to workplace practices, corporate restructuring and job transformation, reforms to enhance business dynamism and productivity growth also need to help people and firms adjust and reallocate in order to seize new opportunities. Going for Growth 2021 provides first-hand advice to governments of OECD and major non-OECD economies on the structural policy priorities needed for a vibrant recovery. It is the OECD’s contribution to the debate on what governments need to do to break away from unsustainable past practices and achieve stronger, more resilient, more equitable and sustainable growth.
The pandemic has also underlined the importance of international cooperation, which can make policy action more effective and less costly. This is why, for the first time, we are putting forward priorities for international policy cooperation: in healthcare, on climate change, on global trade and on the taxation of multinational enterprises. By acting together can help to achieve more. Laurence Boone OECD Chief Economist and G20 Finance Deputy Further reading: OECD (2021), Economic Policy Reforms 2021: Going for Growth, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3c796721-en. Une occasion unique de bâtir
une reprise dynamique par Laurence Boone Cheffe économiste de l’OCDE et Représentante de l’OCDE au G20 pour les affaires financières Après une année 2020 dévastatrice, les perspectives s’éclaircissent. La dynamique vaccinale nous donne de l’espoir tandis que les mesures monétaires et budgétaires exceptionnelles continuent de soutenir les entreprises, les emplois et les revenus, limitant les retombées sociales et économiques de la pandémie. Fait important, la crise liée au COVID-19 a mis en évidence les mécanismes par lesquels les faiblesses structurelles peuvent saper la résilience de nos économies. Les mesures que nous prenons seront déterminantes pour la reprise et l’avenir de nos économies. Les gouvernements doivent agir dès à présent pour lever les obstacles structurels à la croissance; développer la résilience et la durabilité; stimuler la productivité et faciliter la réaffectation des ressources; et aider les individus à s’adapter au changement. Le coût de l’impréparation à la crise du COVID-19 s’est soldé par des pertes en vies humaines, une dégradation des moyens de subsistance et des séquelles sociales et économiques durables. La plupart des systèmes de santé ont dû affronter une vague épidémique mondiale d’une ampleur inédite. Selon les économies, les filets de protection sociale étaient plus ou moins prêts à faire face aux conséquences des périodes de confinement. Les pertes d’emplois et de revenus qui ont suivi ont souvent touché le plus durement les individus les plus
vulnérables. De larges pans de l’activité économique, sociale et éducative ayant basculé en ligne, les coûts d’opportunité des compétences numériques limitées et des infrastructures insuffisantes se sont matérialisés. Pour amortir le choc, les gouvernements ont réagi en prenant des mesures d’urgence d’une taille et d’une ampleur inédites. Pourtant, ces mesures ne règleront pas les problèmes structurels sous-jacents qui sont en fait à l’origine de notre vulnérabilité. La crise n’a fait que s’ajouter aux difficultés préexistantes. Avant la pandémie, nombre d’économies étaient confrontées à une faible croissance de la productivité dans un contexte de dynamique des entreprises en déclin. Le chômage de longue durée, l’économie informelle ainsi que la qualité et la sécurité médiocres des emplois étaient autant de problèmes caractérisant beaucoup de marchés du travail. De plus, la durabilité environnementale et les préoccupations plus générales relatives à la résilience étaient souvent absentes des stratégies en faveur de la croissance. Avec la réouverture des économies dans un monde défini par une montée en puissance du numérique, une évolution des environnements de travail, des restructurations d’entreprise et une transformation de l’emploi, les réformes visant à améliorer la dynamique des affaires et la croissance de la productivité doivent également aider les individus et les entreprises à s’adapter et à réaffecter leurs ressources afin de saisir les nouvelles chances qui s’offrent à eux. La publication Objectif croissance 2021 contient des conseils de première main à l’intention des gouvernements des économies de l’OCDE et des grandes économies non membres concernant les priorités des politiques structurelles à mener pour parvenir à une reprise dynamique. Elle constitue la contribution de l’OCDE au débat portant sur les mesures que les gouvernements doivent prendre pour rompre avec les pratiques non viables du passé et faire advenir une croissance plus forte, plus résiliente, plus équitable et plus durable.
La pandémie a également mis en évidence l’importance de la coopération internationale, gage d’une action publique plus efficace et moins coûteuse. C’est la raison pour laquelle nous mettons en avant, pour la première fois, les priorités de la coopération internationale dans les domaines de la santé, du changement climatique, des échanges internationaux et de la fiscalité des entreprises multinationales. C’est seulement ensemble que nous irons plus loin. A lire: Objectif Croissance 2021: Pour une reprise dynamique American Rescue Plan: A first package of President Biden’s
transformative reforms By Patrick Lenain, Carl Romer and Ben Westmore The American Rescue Plan (ARP) submitted by President Biden and approved by U.S. Congress in mid-March provides US$1.84 trillion (8.4% of GDP) of fiscal support to the economy — a very large stimulus by international standards. Soon after the plan’s approval, the OECD Interim Economic Outlook presented a significant upward revision to the U.S. economic growth forecast, doubling it for 2021 from 3.2% to 6.5%. The fiscal package will boost domestic demand and help activity return more quickly to pre-pandemic levels (Figure 1), with many unemployed workers getting back jobs. Furthermore, OECD modelling highlights that the package may have noteworthy demand spillovers for the major trading partners of the U.S. (for further details, see The American Rescue Plan is set to boost global growth). Figure 1: U.S. GDP projections (trillion of US dollars, constant prices)
Source: OECD Economic Outlook projections. While concerns have been raised that such a large fiscal stimulus could cause a significant future inflation shock, the transformative content of the measures in the package should not be overlooked. As recommended by successive OECD Economic Surveys of the United States, the ARP seeks to address persistent structural challenges that have prevented many Americans from realising their human potential. The Plan will help struggling subnational governments, support unemployed workers, facilitate the reopening of schools, close gaps in unemployment insurance, and reduce child poverty. Besides sending checks of $1400 to eligible families (budget cost of US$412 billion), the Plan contains other important provisions (Figure 2). Figure 2 – American Rescue Plan’s main provisions*
Source: Authors’ compilation from various sources.*
Estimates based on available information and subject to
changes.
Support to subnational governments (US$350 billion). The
ARP allocates financial support to States, territories
and tribes. States that depend on tourism and sales
taxes like Hawaii, Nevada, Florida, Texas have faced
steeper budget shortfalls, whereas other states like
Idaho and Utah saw large revenue increases owing to
strong federal expenditures and relatively short
COVID-19 lockdowns. As argued in past OECD work,
subnational governments play key social and economic
roles, but existing fiscal rules can impose damaging
spending cuts during recessions.
Unemployment relief (US$246 billion). The Plan provides
Federal funding to supplement state-level unemployment
insurance benefits with an additional $300 per week –
less than the supplement of $600 per week in the CARES
Act but nonetheless important, as these benefits wouldotherwise have fallen back to low pre-crisis levels. By supporting unemployment insurance, the ARP will help to keep unemployed workers active in the labour market, rather than becoming discouraged from job search, as seen in past recessions. Support to schools and higher education (US$170 billion). Manyschools had to close during shutdown orders, with detrimental impacts on vulnerable families and the risk of large numbers of dropouts. K-12 Schools will be given US$125 billion in direct aid with another US$40 billion for colleges and universities to reopen in safe conditions. Reducing gaps in educational outcomes, as measured by PISA, has been a recurring OECD policy recommendation. Child benefits and affordable childcare (US$156 billion). A persistent challenge for families has been the absence of affordable childcare, which has depressed the labor-market participation of American women. Also, the lack of affordable early-childhood education, which is decisive in children’s school performance, has created large inequalities. The ARP provides emergency funding for child-care assistance to essential workers unable to telework, typically people in low-income deciles. The Plan also helps 16 million poor and rural K-12 students without access to high-speed internet. The Child Tax Credit and Earned Income Tax Credit will receive a much-needed boost: the Urban Institute projects that this will cut child poverty in half. Health insurance coverage, vaccines and COVID-19 containment (US$125 billion). PastOECD work has recommended closing existing gaps in healthcare insurance, working towards universal coverage through a system of multiple insurance providers. For employees laid off or who otherwise lost their health insurance, ARP provides US$57 billion in funding for employers to retain COBRA coverage for departing employees and a temporary expansion in subsidies that could be used to
pay for health coverage through the Affordable Care Act
public exchange system. In addition, ARP increases
marketplace premium subsidies for people at every income
level and will now be offered to those with income above
4 times the federal poverty level.
While these measures are temporary, the OECD has recommended
permanent reforms to alleviate child poverty, improve K-12
education, close gaps in health insurance, and strengthen
local communities – all with a beneficial impact on long-term
economic growth and well-being. Other reforms recommended by
the OECD include wider access to high-speed internet;
investment in green technologies; and strengthening anti-trust
actions to protect consumers against oligopolies’ market
dominance.
President Biden has now turned his attention to implementing
new policies to boost investment, which could have a fiscal
cost of at least US$3 trillion spread across several years.
Notwithstanding the risk of political gridlock, this provides
the opportunity to further address long standing challenges,
including those reform priorities previously identified by the
OECD in the areas of infrastructure, green technologies and
education.
References
OECD (2021), “The need for speed: Putting the World Economy on
the Fast Track out of the COVID-19 crisis”, ECOSCOPE blog, 17
March.
OECD (2020), Economic Survey of the United States, OECD
Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/12323be9-en
Azzopardi, D., F. Fareed, M. Hermansen, P. Lenain and D.
Sutherland (2020), “The decline in labour mobility in the
United States: Insights from new administrative data
Azzopardi, D., F. Fareed, M. Hermansen, P. Lenain and D.Sutherland (2020), “Why are some U.S. cities successful, while others are not? Empirical evidence from machine learning”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1643. The need for speed: Putting the World Economy on the Fast Track out of the COVID-19 crisis by Laurence Boone, OECD Chief Economist This is no ordinary economic crisis. When you walk down the street of a big city like Paris, its hard not to miss the usually lively restaurants, bars and museums. Travel and activity restrictions – completely unfamiliar to most of us just one year ago, have now become a part of our daily lives. In early March 2020, the OECD warned that COVID-19 could have devasting effects on the world economy. One year later, amid high uncertainty, a global recovery is in sight.
We have upgraded our growth projections The good news is that the world economy is doing better than what we expected only three months ago. Countries are learning to better address the health situation, some are rolling out vaccines and are gradually lifting restrictions to mobility. People and firms have also adapted: producing, trading and consuming differently in this new world of restrictions. Undeniably, policy support helps. The exceptional fiscal and monetary support that countries have deployed to protect firms and people is working – supporting jobs, incomes and firms. In addition, the massive foreseen US stimulus (USD 1.9 trillion in addition to USD 900 billion in December 2020) will boost the US economy in 2021 and add a full percent to world output in our projection as discussed in our recent post on the American rescue plan. As a result, we project global growth of 5.6% in 2021 (Table 1), up from 4.2% in our December projections. Most countries are bouncing back, but activity levels remain far behind where we expected them to be in our November 2019 projections before the pandemic. Moreover, divergence in economic performance across and within countries is set to increase. The best economic policy to exit this global pandemic is rapid vaccination, worldwide Differences in health management and vaccine rollout, and consequently restrictions, as well as sectoral specialisation in hard-hit sectors such as tourism and policy support are driving the increase in divergence. Several emerging market economies, as well as European ones, are lagging behind in the recovery (Figure 1).
To speed up the rollout of vaccines, policymakers need to get on a wartime footing with vaccine production and distribution. Production is currently being scaled up thanks to voluntary licensing, but more can be done. Governments should encourage the maximum use of existing manufacturing vaccine facilities and distribution networks, while fast-tracking consents for new facilities where necessary. This means using government purchasing leverage to foster private sector licensing, transfer of technology deals and a cooperative effort across firms that would normally be competitors. Regarding the distribution of vaccines, this means governments requiring and funding vaccination centres to operate seven days per week and long hours. To be effective, vaccine rollout needs to be not only fast, but also global. This is the only way to win the race against virus mutations and to fully reopen sectors such as travel and tourism, which accounts for over 20% of GDP in some countries. As long as the virus is raging somewhere, the risk of new virus variants is high, which will mean that we will need to keep some borders shut, restraining activity. A coordinated and multilateral approach to licensing and technology
transfers, as well as purchasing, notably through increasing funding to COVAX, is the most efficient way of scaling up production and distribution worldwide, and especially in emerging markets. Fiscal support has been key in preserving the economic and social fabric Widespread vaccination will also make fiscal and monetary support more effective. The countries that are able to combine fast vaccination with supportive macroeconomic policies are the ones expected to benefit from faster recoveries (Figure 2). As our economies re-open, many entertainment hotel and restaurant workers can hope to get back to work. But, prospects are not the same for everyone. Following the Global Financial Crisis, young people struggled to find employment and policy was too slow to react – it took a decade for the employment prospects of graduates to “normalise” (Figure 3). To avoid such a negative outcome and the scarring effects of unemployment this time around, fiscal policy needs to be better targeted at supporting young people, for example by introducing wage subsidies to help firms expand apprenticeship and in-firm training programmes. It also needs to make use of the opportuntity to pave the way forward for a better future – fixing the massive digital divide exposed by the pandemic and directing investment to support environmental sustainability.
With the arrival of vaccines, the world economy will eventually fully re-open for business. But how the recovery is going to shape up is in the hands of policymakers: swift
vaccination, targeted fiscal support and ramping up investment in new and green technologies can make a difference. Many challenges lie ahead but this crisis has taught us the importance of resilience: our ability to both avoid and respond to shocks. And, without multilateral co-operation the global recovery in growth and the jobs that go with it are at risk. There is no time to waste! Reference: OECD (2021), OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2021, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/34bfd999-en. The Covid-19 Crisis and the Automotive Industry in Central and Eastern Europe: Risks and Opportunities By Caroline Klein, OECD Economics Department In many Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries,
including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania, the automotive sector plays an important role in economic growth and employment. The industry has been hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic (Figure 1). Lockdown measures in spring 2020 forced factories to close down or to operate at a fraction of their normal capacity. Demand for motor vehicles plunged and is likely to be subdued for longer, reflecting income losses and heightened uncertainty. A recent OECD paper discusses the industry’s outlook in the CEE region and shows it will mainly hinge on foreign demand and the ability to seize new opportunities as the industry adapts and transforms. The economic outlook is highly uncertain, but, after a sharp recovery in the third quarter of 2020, activity in the industry will likely remain subdued in the short to medium run. The Covid-19 crisis is expected to have a long-lasting impact on economic growth in CEE countries’ main trading partners (OECD, 2020). In 2021, demand for cars manufactured in Europe is projected to remain below its pre-crisis level, based on OECD Economic Outlook projections and an estimated relationship between car sales and GDP growth.
The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on car demand will vary by market segment. Consumers tend to buy smaller cars during economic downturns, which can benefit countries specialised in mass-market segments. At the same time, while sales of fossil- fuel powered cars have plunged, demand for electric cars has remained high. This shift might not benefit car producers in CEE countries, as alternative cars still account for a low share of total production in the region. There have been concerns that the pandemic could cause supply chains disruptions with large negative impact on the automotive industry because of its high degree of integration into global value chains. Until now, supply disruptions have played a more limited role in crisis transmission mechanisms than the shock to demand. At the same time, bankruptcy risks among sub-contractors, especially the smaller ones, have increased and shortages of semi-conductors have affected car production. In the longer term, the crisis could leave lasting scars in the industry, by stalling investment and upgrading to knowledge-intensive activities. This is worrisome, as investment is needed to adapt to structural transformations, especially the shift to alternative powertrains and digitalisation. Besides, it is unclear if the pandemic might trigger a shortening of the supply chains, offering CEE countries opportunities to tighten the links between multinational car producers and domestic suppliers. Policies to improve the investment climate and strengthen resilience of viable firms can help the recovery. Addressing labour shortages and adapting skills to fast-changing manufacturers’ needs will be key to maintain competitiveness of the CEE region in the automotive industry. Further reading Klein C., J. Høj, and G. Machlica, (2021), “The impacts of the
COVID-19 crisis on the automotive sector in Central and Eastern European Countries” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No.1658, OECD Publishing, Paris. Preparing for better times: Chile’s policy priorities for an inclusive recovery By Paula Garda and Nicolas Ruiz, Economics Department Over the past 20 years, Chile has made tremendous progress towards greater economic prosperity, more than doubling its per capita income while lifting many Chileans out of poverty. Such achievements have come to a halt during 2020 as Chile has faced two unprecedented shocks: the social protests of end 2019 and the COVID-19 outbreak. Those shocks have plunged Chile into a recession with a magnitude unseen since the 1982 monetary crisis. The policy reactions to the pandemic have been swift and bold to cushion an unprecedented shock for the households and firms. However, as Chile is heading towards a gradual recovery from the pandemic, there is a pressing need for more profound economic and social transformations to achieve a recovery shared by all, putting Chile on a more inclusive and sustainable growth path. Chile must fill its twin missing middles: a weak middle class, and a lack of dynamic midsize firms, making Chile’s middle class weak overall. More than half of Chilean households are economically vulnerable. Those are households not counted as poor but are at risk poverty, due to low income and a lack of sufficient minimum wealth to cope with an adverse income shock (Figure 1). Many of these households might have fell into
poverty during 2020. At the same time, Chile exhibits a persistent division between a small number of large and productive firms and a long tail of small and midsize companies with considerably lesser productivity performance (Figure 2). Such productivity polarization tends to sustain a vulnerable middle-class: the scarcity of higher-productivity and higher-wage jobs generates informal and precarious jobs, associated with low social protection and low, unstable income, amplifying the risk of falling back into poverty in a recession or in the event of a health crisis.
The survey identifies policy priorities for a successful
recovery and to build a strong and prosperous middle-class in
Chile. These measures and reform areas include:
Stepping-up the efficiency of the tax and transfer
systems: The tax and transfer system barely reduces
inequality. The base of the personal income tax is too
narrow and broadening it after the recovery is well on
its way would raise needed revenue. In return, the extra
resources can be devoted to the creation of a negative
income tax, which would assure each household and
individual a basic benefit.
Promote access to quality education for all: Access to
good education remains strongly linked to the socio-
economic status of the family. Spending on education
should be stepped-up and prioritized on high-quality
early childhood, primary and secondary education, as a
prerequisite for raising skill levels and expanding
tertiary education. While the effects of these policies
will be felt only in the long run, it constitutes a
pivotal lever to fight now the consequences that
COVID-19 could imprint on inclusiveness and inequalityof opportunities.
Increase the relevance and quality of training: Access
of vulnerable workers to training courses is
insufficient and many of their job profiles might change
in the future or even disappear with automation risk.
Training programmes should be reviewed to increase
quality and relevance and target those that need it the
most ensuring that all workers, particularly the most
vulnerable, have adequate opportunities for retraining
and finding good-quality jobs.
Generalize zero-licensing procedures: The regulatory
environment inhibits competition and the scaling up of
firms. Generalizing “zero licensing” by involving
municipalities in the design of the initiative could
ease firm entry and formalization, which could
contribute to reducing inequalities over time by
creating better paying jobs.
Boosting the digital transformation: The crisis
highlighted disparities in digital skills and technology
access and use among Chilean students, workers and
firms. One of the biggest challenges is the access to
high-speed broadband internet, particularly in rural
areas. Lower entry barriers in the communication sector
could accelerate both fixed and mobile network
deployment and improve access to high-speed broadband
services at competitive prices. Stepping up digital
skills and firms’ adoption of digital tools, mainly
SMEs, would help workers and firms in the transition to
a swift recovery. Chile needs better integrating digital
skills in school and enhancing teacher training. More
targeted programmes for the adoption of digital tools
and the development of financing instruments, notably
for SMEs, designed in close collaboration with the
private sector, would allow them to adopt digital tools.
More information:http://oe.cd/chile OECD (2020), OECD Economic Surveys: Chile 2020, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/79b39420-en Public Health and Federalism amidst the Coronavirus Pandemic by Sean Dougherty (@econecho) & Pietrangelo De Biase, OECD Fiscal Network The rapid global spread of the Coronavirus caught authorities by surprise one year ago. In a matter of weeks, a virus outbreak that initially seemed to affect only China and a few neighbouring countries spread to virtually all countries around the World. Time was short to digest the impact of the outbreak, while little was known about the mortality rate of the virus, nor about the effectiveness of various containment measures and treatments.
Public health is often managed by multiple levels of government, which poses special coordination challenges for quickly designing and implementing a harmonised response. The OECD’s Fiscal Network and Joint Health Network have shown that subnational governments (SNGs) are often responsible for managing health inputs and budgeting, while central governments define policy and carry out oversight (James et al., 2020). Many decisions related to healthcare are shared across levels of government. Consequently, intergovernmental coordination is crucial. A wide range of coordination mechanisms have been deployed, yet there still exists substantial uncertainty regarding what does and doesn’t work. Alternative mechanisms have widely varying advantages as well as implementation challenges, and no single approach can be considered superior to all others. Notably, there are successful cases of both centralised and decentralised responses, although centralised responses were twice as frequent as decentralised ones in a survey of policy
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